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OLIVER

P.

FIELD*

one of article four of the constitution of the United
States provides that:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the Public
Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which
such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof."
Thetpredecessor of the full faith and credit clause in the constitution was doubtless the statement in article four of the Articles of
Confederation that:
"Full faith and credit shall be given, in each of these States,
to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the Courts and
Magistrates of every other State."
A comparison of the two provisions reveals that the word "Acts"
is included in both of them, but that in the constitution it is -preceded by the word "public." The position of "Acts" in the
Articles of Confederation was such that it seemed to refer to
courts and magistrates, while in the present constitution the phrase
"public acts" appears to stand alone, independent of judicial proceedings, and this seems equally true of the word "records."'
What is meant by the phrase "public acts" as it is used in the
constitution? What effect must the public acts of one state be
accorded by the courts of another? How are the courts of one
state to ascertain what the public acts of another state are, in a
given case? This study will concern itself with these three probECTION

*Sterling Fellow, Yale University School of Law, New Haven, Conn.
1
For a summary and review of the debates on this subject in the
Convention of 1787 see 2 Watson, The Constitution, pp. 1193-97; Cook,
W. W., The Powers Of Congress Under The Full Faith And Credit
Clause, 28 Yale L. J. 420-26; Note, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 805, note 11.
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lems, and the effect to be given to the judicial proceedings of
other states will be considered only in so far as it seems to shed
some light upon questions raised in connection with public acts.
What does the phrase "public acts" include, if we assume
that it refers to something other than judicial proceedings? The
debates of the constitutional convention do not give a conclusive
answer to this question, and a state court attempting to determine
the meaning of the phrase has said :2
"So far as we have been able to ascertain there is not a word
to be found touching the meaning of 'public acts' or relating
to the power of Congress to prescribe their effect, in any judgment
of the United States Supreme Court."
In present day speech the phrase would probably be considered
as synonymous with legislative acts, or statutes. Congress has
apparently given this interpretation to the phrase and there is
judicial opinion in support of it,3 although the statement of one
court that: "Of course, the full faith and credit clause of the
federal constitution does not relate to the statutes of a sister jurisdiction ' 4 indicates that this support is not unanimous.
Whether resolutions passed by a state legislature are included
has not been decided, although the question was mooted in one
case.5 It would seem that.if joint resolutions are treated as having
the same dignity and force as statutes in a state that they should be
so regarded by other states so far as the full faith and credit clause
is concerned. 6 State constitutions should perhaps be included and
2

Crippen v. Laighton, (1899) 69 N. H. 540, 44 Atl. 538.
3U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 687, 28 U.- S. C. A. sec. 687, Mason's Code,
tit. 28, sec. 687 provides for the authentication of "The acts of the legislature of any State" etc. The opinion in Eastern Loan Association v.

Ebaugh, (1902) 185 U. S.114, 22 Sup. Ct. 566, 46 L. Ed. 830 seems to

treat the term as including statutes. The group of cases holding that
mere misconstruction of sister-state laws does not constitute a violation
of the full faith and credit clause imply that legislative enactments
are within the meaning of the phrase. Smithsonian Institution v.
St. John, (1909) 214 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 601, 53 L. Ed. 892; Banholzer
v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1899) 178 U. S. 402, 20 Sup. Ct. 792, 44
L. Ed. 1124. See 'Crippen v. Laighton, (1899) 69 N. H. 540, 44 Atl.
538, 2 Watson, op. cit., p. 1196. In Dougherty v. American McKenna
Process Co., (1912) 225 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619, L. R. A. 1915F 955 the
court speaks of laws as being included within the phrase. See on this
point, 2 Farrand, Debates 447-48.
4Wellman v. Mead, (1919) 93 Vt. 322, 107 AtI. 396. In Minnesota
v. Northern Securities Co., (1903) 194 U. S. 48, 72, 24 Sup. Ct. 598, 48
L. Ed. 870, it was said, "Even if it be assumed that the word 'acts' includes 'Statutes'" etc.
5
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, (1919) 249 U. S. 490, 39
Sup. Ct. 336, 63 L. Ed. 722.
OThe constitution of Kansas of 1859, still in force, provides, in
Article II, sec. 14, that joint resolutions shall be treated the same as
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there is some reason to believe that they are,7 and a few recent
cases seem to indicate that in some types of cases, at least, judicial
decisions construing and interpreting state statutes are also to be
included." Corporation charters have also been treated as public
acts,0 and one case goes so far as to hold that public acts are the
equivalent of "official acts," including under this caption executive as well as legislative acts. 10
bills, so far as voting in the two houses is concerned, as well as for
purposes of signature by the governor. The same was true in the
Michigan constitution of 1850, Article 4, section 19. Olds v. Commissioners, (1901) 134 Mich. 442, 86 N. W. 956. The present constitution
of Michigan does not contain this provision, but a case might easily
arise in which a resolution passed under the constitution of 1850 would
be involved.
7
Converse v. Hamilton, (1911) 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56
L. Ed. 749, involving Minnesota constitutional and statutory provisions in a Wisconsin case. In Smithsonian Institution v. St. John,
(1909) 214 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 601, 53 L. Ed. 892, the New York
courts were asked to declare an Ohio statute contrary to the Ohio
state constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
the holding of the New York court that the statute in question did
not violate the Ohio constitutional provision against special legislation
did not deny the Ohio constitution and decisions full faith and credit,
thereby implying that state constitutions are included. In such a case
both the statutes and the state constitution are involved, and both are
construed, in the 'process of determining the constitutionality of the
statute. At the time the constitution of the United States was framed
the distinction now existing between constitution and statute had not
been well perceived, and indeed even now the line is difficult to draw
at times. The early state constitutions were framed by legislative
bodies in many instances and it is a reasonable inference that the
Convention of 1787 meant to include them in the phrase "public
acts." State constitutions are included in the phrase "law and usage"
for the purpose of ascertaining the effect to be given to the judicial
proceedings of another state, under the congressional statute cited in
note 3. See Dodge v. Coffin, (1875) 15 Kan. 277 and some of the cases
in note
72.
8
Modern Woodman of America v. Mixer, (1925) 267 U. S. 544,
45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783; Eastern Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Ebaugh,
(1902) 185 U. S. 114, 22 Sup. Ct. 566, 46 L. Ed. 830.
9Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, (1925) 267 U. S. 544,
45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783; Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum
v. Green, (1915) 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089. In
the latter case the court said that the "charter of the corporation and
the laws of the state are to determine the powers of the corporation."
In a Comment, 28 Yale L. J. 329, the statement is made in approving
the Arcanum Case, that "This extension will tend to unify to a
greater degree the decisions of our numerous jurisdictions, and open
the way for a possible further broadening of the scope of the 'full
faith and credit' clause to apply to all statutes."
10In the instant case, a pardon. United States v. Wilson, (C.C.
Pa. 1830) Baldw. 78, Fed. Cas. 16,730. In this case the following
statement was made: "The fourth article of the constitution of the
United States makes the official acts of one state evidence in all others."
It is possible to support this decision on the ground that a record of
a pardon is a "public record," and thus provable when authenticated
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Definitions of the phase "public acts" have, however, thus far
been attempted in dicta more often than in decision, and it is
difficult, in the present state of the authorities, to know the exact
content of the phrase. It may be that its content will vary from
one type of case to another and that in one situation state statutes
will be included while in another situation corporate charters and
judicial decisions may be added.
The second problem to be considered in connection with public
acts and the full faith and credit clause is the effect to be given
them by other states. The constitutional mandate is that full faith
and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts of every
other state. Is this provision self-executing or is congressional
legislation required to enable the courts to enforce it? The fact
that Congress is empowered to prescribe the effect to be given
by one state to the public acts of other states seems to furnish argument in support of the view that it is not self-executing." It
may or may not be significant, but it is at least confusing that
Congress has not included in its legislation relative to the full
faith and credit clause any statement of the effect to be given to
public acts, while it has prescribed the effect to be given to the
judicial proceedings of other states.' 2
under U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 688, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 688, Mason's Code,
tit. 28 sec. 688, and when so proved is entitled to the same effect as
a judgment authenticated in accordance with U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 687,
28 U. S. *C. A. sec. 687, iMason's -Code, tit. 28, sec. 687, namely, the
effect that it has by "law or usage" in the state in which it was
rendered.
"The text of the first section of article four is so worded as
expressly to include public acts, so far as the power of Congress over
their effect is concerned.
See infra note 35. Compare the use of
shall in this section with that in section three of article four, dealing
with the rendition of fugitive from justice. See Kentucky v. Dennison,
(1860) 24 How. (U.S.) 66, 16 L. Ed. 717.
22U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 687, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 687, Mason's Code,
tit. 28, sec. 687, provides that the judgments of other states shall be
given the effect that they have by "law or usage" in the state in which
they are rendered.. As to the effect to be given public acts Congress
has apparently only prescribed the effect which shall be given to those
of territories. Act of -March 27, 1804, 2 S.. at L. 299, sec. 2. The
modern version of this early statute is found in U. S. C. tit. 28, sec.
687, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 687, Mason's Code, tit. 28, sec. 687. This
statute has been held to be within the power of Congress. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers, (1909) 213 U. S. 55, 29 Sup.
Ct. 397, 53 L. Ed. 695, although there is some doubt as to the authority
of the case. This arises from the fact that not all of the Act of
March 27, 1804 was incorporated into U. S. R. S. sec. 906. The act
of March 27, 1804 was an amendment to the Act of May 26, 1790, 1
S. at L. 122, providing for the authentication of acts of legislatures
as well as judicial proceedings; prescribing the effect to be given the
latter, but not the former. The statute of 1790 applied in terms
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If it be true that the requirement of full faith and credit as
applied to public acts has some operative effect without the aid of
congressional legislation the problem of the test as to what constitutes "full faith and credit" remains to be considered.
State courts have often applied the statutes of sister states in
disposing of civil cases in which they were involved. Their application has, however, usually been predicated upon principles of
comity rather than upon any rule of constitutional law.' 3 The
effect of the full faith and credit clause on the choice of sisterstate law has seldom been considered,14 but most of the state courts
assume that comity is still the basis for the application of the
law of another state.' 5
only to acts and judicial proceedings of states. The Act of March
27, 1804 applied in terms, as does U. S. R. S. sec. 906, to "all records
and exemplifications of books, which may be kept in any public office
of any state or territory

. . . not appertaining to a court

.

.

.

This is sufficiently broad to include acts of legislatures. The records
here referred to are to have the same effect as judgments, namely, that
which they have by "law or usage" in the state from which they are
taken. However, in the Act of March 27, 1804 this wording was
used in section 2: "That all the provisions of this act, and the act
to which this is a supplement, shall apply as well to the public acts,
records, office books, judicial proceedings, courts and offices of the
respective territories of the United States and countries subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, as to the public acts, records,
office books, and judicial proceedings, courts and offices of the several
states." (Italics those of the writer.) This raises a question: Does
this mean that the statute of May 26, 1790 was hereby amended so
as to give the same effect to public acts as to records and judgments?
If this is what was intended by the Act of March 27, 1804 that portion
of the statute has been dropped in distributing section 2 among the
provisions of what are now secs. 687 and 688 of title 28, U. S. C.
referred to above.
'$There are many cases to this effect. A typical statement is
that found in Carey v. Schmeltz, (1909) 221 Mo. 132, 119 S.W. 946,
"Under the more intimate international law between the sister states
of this Union the laws of one state are given force and effect in
another when the cause of action has arisen under the laws of the
. . .

sister state, yet this is so by comity, not by extraterritorial

force of the foreign law; but comity is never carried to the extent
of enforcing
4

. . . a penal statute of another state."

1 The writer of a note in L. R. A. 1915F 955 thinks it somewhat
remarkable that this question has not been squarely presented and
argued in more cases, in view of the fact that the full faith and credit
clause
applies in terms to "public acts."
'5 In Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., (1912) 255
Il. 369, 99 N. E. 619, L. R. A. 1915F 955 the court said, "It was not
intended by the provision of the federal constitution

. . . to give

to the laws of one state any operation in other states except by a
permission, express or impliedby those states." A somewhat different
attitude is expressed in Zuppman v. Bauer, (1885) 17 Mo. App. 678,
"We have outgrown that judicial conception of the nature of the
federal union, which placed the states of the Union, in respect to
the effect to be given to the laws of one state within the limits of
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The Supreme Court of the United States seems not to have
expressed itself upon this question until 1877, when in the case of
Chicago & Alton R. R. Company v. Wiggins Ferry Company6
Chief Justice Waite said, in what was perhaps a dictum,
"Without doubt the constitutional requirement

. . .

implies

that the public acts of every state shall be given the same effect by
the courts of another state that they have by law and usage at
home."
The case cited by the Chief Justice in support of this proposition
is not squarely in point because it relates to the effect to be given
to judicial proceedings and not to the effect to be given to public
acts.'7 Since 1900 the Supreme Court has decided several cases
which seem to indicate that in some types of cases at least, the
inconclusive dictum of Chief justice Waite may become rule.
In Converse v. Hamilton s the refusal of the Wisconsin supreme court to give to the statutory and constitutional provisions
another state, in the relation of foreign countries, such as the states
of Europe bear to each other."
Wellman v. Mead, (1919) 93 Vt.
322, 107 Atl. 396; "The evident tendency of modern decisions is toward
a broader comity in the enforcement of rights created by the legislation of sister states."
16119 U. S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. 398, 30 L. Ed. 532. Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, (1909) 214 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 601, 53 L. Ed. 892,
wherein the court said, referring to the obligation of the states to
give effect to the public acts of other states, "This duty is as obligatory
as the similar duty in respect to the judicial proceedings of that
state." Becker v. I. -C. R. R. Co., (1910) 158 Ill. App. 520, "It is not
to be assumed the courts of foreign states will refuse to give full
faith and credit to the 'public acts' of this state."
17Mills v. Duryee, (1813) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 481, 3 L. Ed. 411.
28(1911) 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749. The court
said, that: "The supreme court of Wisconsin failed to give full faith
and credit to those laws and to the proceedings thereunder." It is
difficult to classify the cases dealing with the enforcement of personal
liability of stockholders. Most of these- cases involve judicial proceedings in the state in which the liability is supposed to have been
created, but these proceedings do not always proceed to judgment
before an action is brought against the stockholder in another state.
The United States Supreme Court appears to have taken the position, however, that these proceedings are entitled to the same faith
and credit that judgments are, namely, that which they have under
the law and usage of the state where held. Where the liability is
sought to be enforced on a statutory, instead of on a contractual
ground (and it is difficult in some of the cases to know which ground
is used) the cases dealing with this problem probably fall in the
class of cases involving judicial proceedings, because the problem
of the effect to be given to the statutes of the state arises 'only as
incidental to the settlement of the effect to be given to the proceedings
held under the statute. Cases dealing with this problem are: Marin
v. Augedahl, (1917) 247 U. S. 142, 28 Sup. Ct. 452, 62 L. Ed. 1038
(North Dakota must recognize proceedings in Minnesota which fix
liability); Flash v. Conn, (1883) 109 U. S. 371. 3 Sup. Ct. 263, 27 L. Ed.
966 (need not recover judgment in New York to fix liability for
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of Minnesota relating to stockholders liability what the United
States Supreme Court thought their full faith and credit was held
to be a violation of the full faith and credit clause as applied to
public acts, although in that case the effect to be given to the
judicial proceedings of Minnesota was also involved.
The Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green19 involved the power of a fraternal benefit society organized under
the laws of Massachusetts to change the rate of assessment to be
exacted from members. The Massachusetts court held that the
society had the power to make the change. Later the same question became the subject of litigation in New York, the New
York member not being the same person as the one involved in
the Massachusetts case. The society pleaded the Massachusetts
judgment and laws relative to its organization and powers. It
should be noted at this point that this was not a case involving
a suit in one state on a judgment obtaited in another. The
purpose of introducing the Massachusetts judgment in the instant case was to show what the Massachusetts law was so far
as it related to the powers of the society to change the rate
of assessment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
society did not have the power to make the change in question.
On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States decided that
the powers of the society must be determined by reference to the
law of Massachusetts. For the New York court to have refused
to do this constituted a violation of the full faith and credit
clause, because it failed to give the proper effect to the public
acts of Massachusetts. The opinion of the court in the Arcanum
Case treats the effect to be given to public acts as identical with
that to be given. a judgment, but a careful reading of the
opinion has convinced the writer that the case was decided upon the basis that the New York court failed to give proper effect
to the law of Massachusetts in this instance.
purposes of recovery in Florida, because the New York law dispensed
with the necessity of such judgment for fixing liability); Glenn v.
Garth, (1893) 147 U. S. 369, 13 Sup. Ct. 350, 37 L. Ed. 203. See notes
in Ann. Cas. 1913E 245; 34 L. R. A. 763; 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 380;
37 Am. St. Rep. 169. In Great Western Telg. Co. v. Purdy, (1896)
162 U. S. 16 Sup. Ct. 810, 40 L. Ed. 986 it was held that the action
in that case was on the contract of subscription and that therefore
the defense of the statute of limitations was properly decided in
accordance with the law of the forum, and to do so did not deny
full faith and credit to the judgment on which action was brought.
See Kuhn, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of Statutes Imposing
Double Liability Upon Stockholders, 17 Yale L, J. 457.
19(1915) 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089.
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Any doubt respecting the attitude of the Supreme Court
towards the problem presented in the Arcanum Case was doubtless put at rest by the decision in 1925 of Modern Woodnwen of
America v. Mixer.20 In that case the Nebraska court failed to
apply Illinois statutes and decisions in determining the powers
of an Illinois fraternal benefit society, as well as the relations
of members to the society. This was held to constitute a denial
of full faith and credit to the public acts of Illinois.
2
The case of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Dunken l
has provoked considerable comment. That case involved a contract which the Supreme Court of the United States decided had
been entered into in Tennessee. An action on the policy was
brought against the company in Texas. The insured was a resident of Texas at the time of his decease. A Texas. statute provided that any policy payable to a citizen or inhabitant of Texas
should be held to be a contract made and entered into'under "and
by virtue of the laws" of Texas relating to insurance, and that
the contract should be governed thereby, notwithstanding any
provision in the contratt that it should be deemed to have been
executed at the home office in another state. The statute allowed the recovery of a sum equal to 12% of the amount of a
claim against the company for failure to pay such claim within
thirty days after a demand had been made. The provisions of
this statute were made conditions precedent to the doing of business within the state by foreign corporations. The Texas court
upheld the statute and allowed a recovery against the company
(which was a Connecticut corporation doing business in Texas)
for an amount which included 12%o for damages. On appeal the
United States Supreme Court held, as previously indicated, that
the contract was to be construed as a Tennessee contract and
that the Texas statute could not "constitutionally be applied to
a Tennessee contract." If the Texas statute, as construed by
the Texas courts, prevented the courts of that state from applying the law of Tennessee to a Tennessee contract such a statute
g0(1925) 267 U. S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783. The
decisions of the Illinois court said to be denied full faith and credit
were rendered in another case, although the society was also a party
to it.
21(1924) 266 U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 120, 69 L. Ed. 342. Note,
38 Harv. L. Rev. 804, from which the long quotation in the text is
taken. Professor A. A. Bruce says, in 20 Ill. L. Rev. 72, 76,. that
"The suit should not have been brought in Texas at all, the insurance
company being a foreign corporation and only liable to suit in the
state of Texas on contracts made in that state."
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would quite clearly be violative of the full faith and credit clause
as applied to public acts, just as statutes restricting actions on
sister-state judgments are violative of that clause as applied to
judicial proceedings. 22 In accordance with this reasoning the

statement that "on the Supreme Court's view of the principal
case, the Texas court failed to apply the Tennessee statute properly governing the rights of the parties" 23 accurately describes
the result in the Dunken Case.
The Texas statute might also be objectionable from the standpoint of the fourteenth amendment, because it applied to transactions taking place outside the territorial boundaries of the state.
If the attempt to give extraterritorial effect to the statute be regarded as its defect the basis for such a view should be the
fourteenth amendment, rather than the full faith and credit
clause. Some confusion has crept into the cases because of a
failure to keep these two clauses of the constitution differentiated
in their relation to the problem of the extraterritorial effect of
state statutes. It may well be that an attempt to give such effect
to a statute is a violation of the due process clause, but unless
such an attempt results, as in the Dunken Case, in preventing
the application of the public acts of a sister state it does not
contravene the full faith and credit clause as to public acts.
New York Life Insurance Company v. Head24 and New
York Life Insurance Company v. Dodge"' illustrate attempts
by a state to give extraterritorial effect to certain of its statutes.
The Supreme Court decided that the contract in the Dodge Case
was made in New York and that the Missouri statute forbidding
foreign insurance companies to forfeit policies for non-payment
22Infra note 40.

23Note, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 805.
24(1914) 234 U. S. 149, 34 Sup. Ct. 879, 58 L. Ed. 1259.
25(1918) 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337, 62 L. Ed. 772, Ann. Cas.
1918E 593. Such cases as American Fire Ins. Go. v. King Lmbr.
Co., (1918) 250 U. S. 2, 39 Sup. Ct. 431, 63 L. Ed. 810, and National
Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n v. Brahan, (1904) 193 U. S. 635, 24
Sup. Ct. 532, 48 L. Ed. 823 are not inconsistent with the view that
state statutes must be given some effect by the courts of other states
when properly involved. They hold that full faith and credit is not
denied to the statutes of a state by determining a case in accordance
with the law of the state in which the transaction took place, or
where the foreign corporation had become "localized" in its business.
The explanation of these cases is to be sought in the power of the
state over corporations doing business within its borders, and these
cases illustrate the difficulty in determining, as do the Head and
(Dodge Cases, where the transaction took place, or the contract was
made.
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of premiums was inapplicable to the case, because it restricted
citizens of Missouri in making contracts outside of the state.
If a citizen of Missouri wished to make a contract in New York
whereby the policy might be forfeited he had a constitutional
right to do so, said the court. The decision in the Dodge Case
was rested squarely on the basis of the due process clause. The
Head Case presented a similar problem, but the court in that case,
speaking through Justice White,2 6 invoked the full faith and
credit clause in addition to the fourteenth amendment, in holding
that a statute of Missouri could not govern transactions between
a resident of New Mexico and a New York corporation, although
these transactions grew out of a contract made in Missouri.
These two cases indicate that the Supreme Court had not, at the
time they were decided, worked out a clear distinction between
the situations to which the due process clause applied and those
to which the full faith and credit clause was applicable. The
decision of the Dunken Case indicates that the distinction is becoming somewhat more clear, and as stated above, that the due
process clause will be reserved for cases like the Head and Dodge
Cases where extraterritorial effect is sought to be given to a state
statute.
The cases which hold that full faith and credit is not denied
to the public acts of a state by taking jurisdiction over causes of
action created by the laws of another state and restricted as to
the place of trial to the courts of the creating state seem, at first
glance, to present an insurmountable obstacle to the view that
a refusal to apply sister-state statutes will be construed to violate the full faith and credit clause. These cases are, however, to be e: plained on another ground. They discuss, for the
most part, the problem of the transitory nature of particular
types of causes of action. They seem to hold that a state cannot
create a transitory cause of action and at the same time restrict
the trial of such a cause to the courts of that state.2 7 The portions of the statute dealing with the substantive right are applied,
and the only portion disregarded is that dealing with the restriction on the place of trial. The theory underlying this view seems
to be that a state cannot extend its law to another state's territory
so as to forbid the latter's courts to try a cause of action which
in its very nature, the courts say, is such that it can be tried any26(1914) 234 U. S. 149, 161, 34 Sup. Ct. 879, 58 L. Ed. 1259.
27
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. George, (1914) 233 U. S.
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where. While the restrictive clauses of these statutes are not expressly declared unconstitutional, they are at least held inapplicable
for the reason that, as in the Head and Dodge Cases, they represent attempts to give extraterritorial effect to a state statute. To
fail to apply the invalid portion of the statute would naturally
not constitute a denial of full faith and credit. It seems then,
that these cases are not so inconsistent with the Converse, Mixer,
and other cases mentioned, as they might at first glance appear
to be.
Another case to be explained on the basis of the due process
clause is that of Kryger v. Wilson.2 8

In that case a contract to

sell land situated in North Dakota was entered into in Minnesota
and was to be performed in that state. Subsequently an action to
quiet title to the land was instituted in North Dakota. The owner of the land had taken steps to cancel the contract in accordance
with a North Dakota statute. The Minnesota statute governing
the cancellation of such contracts had not been complied with
and the prospective vendee under the contract entered an
appearance in the North Dakota suit, setting up certain rights
under the contract, and alleging that compliance with the North
Dakota statute was insufficient to deprive him of the same. The
North Dakota supreme court affirmed a decision quieting title.
From this decision an appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court "on the ground that the state court had deprived
him of property without due process of law, in holding that the
cancellation proceedings of the vendor in North Dakota, of which
he had had no actual notice, had discharged the contract. The
court held that since the non-resident vendee had appeared in the
suit to quiet title, the North Dakota court had jurisdiction, and
a mere mistake, if any, in applying the wrong rules of the conflict
of laws as to the discharge of the contract, that the lex situs
governed rather than the rule of law of the place of making and
performance, did not deprive him of due process of law as guaranteed by the federal constitution.

' 29

The Kryger Care seems to have decided nothing with respect
to the effect of the full faith and credit clause on the choice of
law by state courts. It did, however, decide that errors in the
354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997, L. R. A. 1916D 685; Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers, (1909) 213 U. S. 55, 29 Sup.
Ct. 397, 53 L. Ed. 695.
28(1916) 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229.
29Comment, 26 Yale L. 3. 405.
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choice of law are not such as to violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. It is difficult to know whether the
Supreme Court would extend the doctrine of the Dunken, Arcanum, and Mixer Cases to a situation such as that presented in
the Kryger Case if the argument of counsel was based on the full
faith and credit clause as applied to public acts. The question
then presented would be: Did the action of the North Dakota
court deny full faith and credit to the statutes of Minnesota?
This question raises a problem in generalization. Do the cases
thus far considered establish the proposition that a refusal to apply
sister-state laws in a proper case will offend against the full faith
and credit clause? Or, shall the rule be formulated with reference
to the types of situations presented in the cases? For example,
shall the rule be formulated with respect to fraternal benefit societies on the basis of the cases involving such associations, with
respect to corporations on the authority of Converse v. Hamilton,
and with respect to insurance companies on the basis of the Dunkew
Case? Certain it is that Kryger v. Wilson does not establish that
a refusal-to apply sister-state law constitutes no violation of the
full faith and credit clause. It is equally clear that the Danken
Case does not establish that such a refusal, in all cases, constitutes
a violation of that clause. The real problem in this connection
is that of determining how far the Supreme Court will extend
the rules of the Converse, Arcanum, Mixer, and Dunken Cases. It
may be that the doctrine expressed in these cases will be restricted
to commercial and mutual benefit associations. It may not be
without significance that the cases holding that a mere misconstruction of a sister-state statute does not violate the full faith and
credit clause have also been cases of this type. Such cases are
Allen v. Alleghany Company"0 and Western Life Insurance Company v. Rupp."- In them a distinction is drawn between a refusal
to apply sister-state law and a misconstruction of such law.3 2 The
implication of these cases is that if the application of sister-state
law was refused in a proper case such refusal would constitute a
violation of the full faith and credit clause.
30(1904) 196 U. S. 458, 25 Sup. Ct. 311, 49 L. Ed. 551.
81(1914) 235 U. S. 275, 35 Sup. Ct. 37, 50 L. Ed. 225. Also Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co.,
(1917)2 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610.
S johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1902) 187 U. S. 490, 23
Sup. Ct. 191, 47 L. Ed. 273; Eastern Building and Loan Ass'n v.
Williamson, (1903) 189 U. S. 122, 23 Sup. Ct. 527, 47 L. Ed. 735.
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The Supreme Court may, however, gradually extend the doctrine of the insurance and benefit society cases so as to include a
variety of situations in which sister-state statutes are involved. It
may be that Professor E. M. Dodd is a little over-optimistic as to
the place which that court is about to assume with respect to state
courts' errors in the field of conflict of laws,3" but certainly one
cannot but feel that the cases warrant the belief that the full faith
and credit clause will receive a somewhat broader interpretation
and application than it has in the past. In strict accuracy it is perhaps incorrect to say that the Court has given a meaning to the full
faith and credit clause limiting its application to the situations referred to above, for until recently it was not called upon to give it
any construction at all so far as public acts are concerned.
A comparison of the effect to be given to public acts with that
required to be given to judicial proceedings of other states may
be suggestive. The language of section one of article four of the
constitution indicates that in the absence of congressional legislation the same effect is to be given to both of them.3
The
text of the constitution at this point seems to empower Congress
to prescribe the effect to be given to public acts as well as judicial
proceedings.3" The fact that Congress has not included in its
33
The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions
in the field of Conflict of Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 553. See the
reference to this article in Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the
Conflict of Laws, 37 Yale L. J. 468, 481. Professor Yntema explains
the Mixer, Dunken, and Arcanum Cases on the ground of the peculiar
economic factors and policies involved in mutual benefit and insurance
cases. The suggestion of Professor Yntema that there is danger that
the "vested rights" theory of the conflict of laws is about to be read
into the full faith and credit clause seems to anticipate a great deal.
If the full faith and credit clause is to be given its natural connotation it will perhaps be for other reasons than those connected with
the vested rights theory of the conflict of laws. No attempt is made
in this study to take up the subject of Mr. Dodd's article, namely.
how far do state court's errors in the choice of law present a federal

question?
4

8 See the wording of the section, reprinted on the first page of this
study.
3GSupra note 12. In the article cited in note 1 Professor Cook
takes the view that Congress may enact legislation prescribing the
effect of public acts as well as that to be given to judicial proceedings, and advocates specific legislation with regard to, judgments.
Reasoning from the text of the first section of article four, one would
conclude that the power of Congress was the same with respect to
public acts and iudgments. Practically nothing is tb, be found in the
Debates of the Convention of 1787 bearing on the power of Congress
to prescribe the effect to be given. public acts. However, one of the
proposals put before the Convention contained a provision giving
Congress the power to prescribe "The effect which judgments obtained
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legislation any requirement as to the effect to be given public
acts has previously been alluded to. Congress has, however, prescribed by statute that the states must give to judicial proceedings
the same effect that they have by "law or usage" in the state
from which they are brought. 36 There have been, in a few caes,
dicta indicating that the faith and credit to be given public acts is
exactly the same as that to be accorded judicial proceedings,3" but
it is clear from the decisions that this is not the law.
In Fauntleroy v. Lurnt8 suit was brought in Mississippi on a
Missouri judgment which had been rendered on a gambling contract, such contracts being illegal by the laws of Mississippi. A
Mississippi statute provided that such a contract "should not be
enforced by any court" in that state. The United States Supreme
Court decided that the Mississippi statute did not go to the power
of the state court to entertain suit on the judgment, but only
furnished a rule of decision, and held that the Mississippi court
must allow the suit. The Supreme Court pointed out in the
in one state shall have in another" and in voting on a committee report
embodying this clause it was stricken out, and the present phraseology
finally substituted, so that now the section reads so as to empower
Congress to prescribe the effect of "judicial proceedings." "The effect
thereof" as used in this section of the constitution seems to refer to
"acts, records, and judicial proceedings." On the whole then, the case
is textually as sound, and historically more sound, for the power of
Congress in connection with public acts than for its power with respect
to judicial
proceedings.
6
3 U. S. C. tit. 28 sec. 687, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 687, Mason's Code, tit.
28, sec. 687. Mills v. Duryee, (1813) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 481, 3 L. Ed. 411;
McEmoyle v. Cohen, (1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 312, 10 L. Ed. 177; Hampton v. McConnell, (1818) 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 234, 4 L. Ed. 378; Hancock
Ntl. Bank v. Farnum, (1899) 176 U. S. 640, 20 Sup. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed.
619. The state to which the judgment is brought is to decide for itself
what the effect of the judgment is in the state wherein it was rendered,
and a mistake in deciding this question does not deny full faith and
credit to either the judgment or the laws of the state. See cases in
notes 18, 21 and 32. The explanation of such a case as Andrews v.
*Andrews, (1902) 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366 is to be
found in the rule that to refuse to give effect to a judgment rendered
-by a court in another state not having jurisdiction, either in the sense
of power to try the case, or in the sense of power over the persons or
things involved, does not constitute a violation of the full faith and
credit clause.
11See the quotation from Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, 16,
supra. Also the following, from Becker v. I. C. R. R. Co., (1910) 158
Ill. App. 520, "The 'public acts' of this state are of as much dignity as
the judicial proceedings of any other state." In Olmstead v. "Olinstead, (1910) 216-U. S. 386, 30 Sup. Ct. 292, 54 L. Ed. 530 Justice Holmes
said, "The full faith and credit clause of the constitution applies with
no more effect to the legislative acts of a foreign state than it does
to the judgment of the courts of such state."
38(1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1029.
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course of its opinion that it was for the Mississippi court to determine what effect a judgment of Missouri would have in the latter
state. If the Missouri judgment was valid in that state the Mississippi court must allow an action on it despite the fact that the
cause of action on which it was rendered was not recognized by
Mississippi law.
Another striking case is that of Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of
the World, Loyal Order of Moose,39 wherein suit was brought in
Illinois on a judgment rendered in Alabama. The judgment had
been recovered on a cause of action arising from the death of a
person occurring outside the state of Illinois. A statute of the
state forbade the bringing of actions in Illinois courts for death
occurring outside the state. The Illinois court decided that this
statute in effect forbade suits on judgments rendered in other
states for such deaths, and refused to entertain the action. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that the Illinois statute,
as construed by the Illinois court, was unconstitutional because
violative of the full faith and credit clause as applied to judgments.4 0 The courts of the state, being otherwise competent to
take jurisdiction, must entertain an action on the judgment.
These two cases indicate that the Supreme Court will go very
far in compelling the states to give full faith and credit to sisterstate judgments, though perhaps no farther than intended by
Congress when it enacted its legislation governing this subject.
Under these decisions it seems as though a state will not be free
to formulate and enforce rules of public policy which interfere
with the constitutional and congressional mandate that a state shall
give to judicial proceedings of other states full faith and credit,
the measure of that credit being that which they have by law
and usage in the state in which the proceedings are held.
It is clear that the Supreme Court has not gone this far with
respect to public acts, but whether it would go farther than it has
gone in case Congress were to legislate as to the effect to be given
public acts is a question. In the absence of congressional legislation the Court is likely to push ahead rather slowly, and the
advances will be by particular decisions, so that considerable uncer39(1920) 252 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 64 L. Ed. 638.
40Similarly as to state statutes of limitations barring actions on
sister-state judgments if the original cause of action would have been
barred by the law of the forum: Christmas v. Russell, (1866) 5 Wall.
(U.S.) 290, 18 L. Ed. 475; Hood v. McGehee, (1915) 237 U. S. 615, 35
Sup. Ct. 718, 59 L. Ed. 1146; Dodge v. Coffin, (1875) 15 Kan. 277.
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tainty as to the exact effect of the public acts clause will be inevitable. It may be that in the course of time the Supreme Court
will come to the position that public acts shall have as much effect
in another state as that accorded to judicial proceedings. There
would, of course, be constitutional warrant for treating both
public acts and judicial proceedings as having the same effect
in a sister state.
It is questionable whether it would be desirable in all cases
to give them equal effect. Carefully considered legislation on the
part of Congress relative to this subject might do much to avoid
the confusion and uncertainty which are almost certain to attend
a judicial elaboration of the public acts clause. But unless such
legislation was very carefully and cautiously worked out the
cure might be worse than the evil. Congress might conceivably
provide that the public acts of one state should be applied in another state when by the rules of the conflict of laws they would be
applicable, and that to deny their application in such a case would
constitute a violation of the public acts section of the full faith
and credit clause. On the other hand, Congress could perhaps
specify in detail the situations in which the public acts of a state
must be given effect. The mention of these two alternatives would
be sufficient, no doubt, to cause many judges and lawyers, as
well as some law teachers, to prefer the uncertainties that now
exist in the subject under consideration to the possibilities of either
of these alternatives. It is conceivable, however, that carefully
drafted congressional legislation on this subject might tend to
settle some of the difficulties and uncertainties now existing in
connection with this clause of the constitution.
If Congress should deem it desirable that the states should be
restricted as to the policy which they may enforce with regard to
-giving effect to the public acts of other states, in the same way
that they are now restricted with regard to sister-state judgments,
legislation should make that clear. If not, then that should be
equzally clear. It is not to be anticipated that a state will have
to grant to its courts jurisdiction to take any different types of
cases than they now take. The giving effect to the public acts of
another state only means that if the courts of one state do take,
and have jurisdiction over, a particular type of case, and that case
is such that it should, either on the basis of rules formulated by
Congress, if Congress has the power to formulate such rules, or
on the basis of the rules of the conflict of laws, be determined in
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accordance with the public acts of another state, then such case
must be decided on the basis of these public acts. As the authorities now stand it is difficult to know when a failure to decide a
*case in accordance with the public acts of another state constitutes
a violation of the full faith and credit clause and when it does
not. This difficulty is partly due to the confused state of the rules
of the conflict of laws, and partly due to scarcity of decisions
dealing with the effect to be given to public acts. The problem
is therefore, a double one.
This study is primarily concerned with civil cases, and no attempt will be made here to consider the problems arising in conlaection with the faith and credit to be given (1) to the public
acts of a state dealing with criminal matters, or (2) the effect to
be given sister-state judgments for money, rendered in a criminal
or quasi-criminal proceeding, if any such there be.4 '
Assuming that in a particular case a state court must consult
the public acts or law and usage of another state the question
remains to be considered: how is a court to know what the law of
another state is, and, having determined the method of ascertaining
the existence of the law, who is to pass upon the existence and
-interpretation of that law, the court or jury?
41AII of the cases dealing with the subject assume that the courts
of one state will not enforce the criminal statutes of other states. The
only difficulty in this connection arises in defining the term "criminal
statutes" for the purposes of this rule. On the question whether this

rule applies to cases in which a judgment for money has been obtained

by the state or by some private person acting in behalf of the state
the following cases, read in the order here listed may be interesting.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance (1889) 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370,
32 L. Ed. 239 (suit by Wisconsin in the United States Supreme Court
to collect on a judgment obtained in the Wisconsin courts); Fauntleroy
v. Lum, (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1029 (statement by Justice Holmes to this effect, "However, the whole passage
was only a dictum and it is not worth while to spend much time upon
it," on referring to the Pelican case) ; Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146
U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123; Scoville v. Canfield, (1817)
14 John. (N.Y.) 338; Healy v. Root, (1831) 11 Pick. (Mass.) 389;
Indiana v. Helmer, (1866) 21 Ia. 370; Spencer v. Brockway, (1824)
1 Ohio 259; Symons v. Eichelberger, (1924) 110 Oh. St. 224, 239, 144
N. E. 279 (reference to the Brockway Case); Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., (1889) 127 U. S. 265, 293, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L. Ed. 239
(referring to the state cases herein listed); Arkansas v. Bowen, (1894)
3 D. C. App. 537; Schuler v. Schuler, (1904) 209 Ill. 522, 71 N. E. 16;
Note L. R. A. (N.S.) 87. A somewhat analogous problem is raised by
the case of disqualifications against witnesses convicted of a criminal
offense in another state. On this problem see -Commonwealth v. Green,
(1822) 17 Mass. 514; State v. Foley, (1880) 15 Nev. 64, 37 Am. Rep. 458;
Sims v. Sims, (1878) 75 N. Y. 466; Chase v. Blodgett, (1838) 10 N.

H. 24.
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In the absence of statute the rule seems firmly established that
the courts of one state will not take judicial notice of the law of
another state.42 Two early cases, one in Georgia4 3 and the other
in Vermont 44 have taken a contrary view, but they are in hopeless
minority, although they forecast the change in the rule which
has been made by statute in several of the states. 45 The rule is
generally stated that courts will not judicially notice foreign or
sister-state law but such law is to be proved as a fact. If that
is true, how is the law of a sister state to be proved, first, as to
its statutes, and second, as to its judicial decisions?
The present congressional statute governing the authentication
46
legislative acts of other states provides,
the
of
"The acts of the legislature of any state or territory, or of any
country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, shall be
authenticated by having the seal of such state, territory, or country
affixed thereto."
-A different method is provided for the authentication of records
other than those of judicial proceedings, 47 and an authentication
insufficient under the section dealing with public acts has been
admitted as proof of the law of a sister state because it complied
with the statute governing the authentication of records. 48
425 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2573; Notes, 4 L. R. A. 40
and 67 L. R. A. 34. On the various meanings of, and the general

theory of, judicial notice, see 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec.
2566-67. A few of the recent cases refusing to take judicial notice,
in actions not on judgments from other states, are: Rashall v. St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. Co., (1913) 249 Mo. 516, 155 S. W.
426; Bopst v. Williams, (1921) 287 Mo. 317, 229 S. W. 796; Hayes
Machinery Co. v. Wastham, (1920) 147 La. 387, 84 So. 898; Yeazel v.
The L. & N. Ry. Co., (1921) 13 Ohio App. 499. See the discussion
in Peet
v. Hatcher, (1895) 112 Ala. 514, 21 So. 715, 57 L. R. A. 55.
43Herschfeld v. Drexel & Co., (1853) 12 Ga. 582. "I am inclined

to think, and such will be found to be the practice, that the court on
the trial of a cause, may proceed on their knowledge of the laws of
another state; and their judgments will not be reversed when they

proceed on such knowledge, unless it should appear that they decided
wrong,
44 as to those laws."
State v. Rood, (1840) 12 Vt. 396, where the court said that "it
was not necessary to prove the law if it was known to the court at
the 4trial,
or if it is now known to be as decided on the trial."
5
Infra note 97.
46U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 687, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 687, Mason's Code,
tit. 28, sec. 687.
47U. S. C. tit. 28, sec. 688, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 688, Mason's Code,
tit. 28,
sec. 688.
48
Wilson v. Lazier, (1854) 11 Gratt. (Va.) 477. The statute of
1790 enacted for the authentication of public acts was not mentioned
in this case.
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This statute has been held not to exclude other methods of
authenticating and proving legislative acts,4 and many states have
their own statutes governing this subject,50 many of which are not
the same as the federal statute. It is sufficient that the authentication satisfies the requirements of either the state or federal
statute,5 ' and at least one court has admitted the authentication
although it failed to comply with either statute, on the ground that
52
it would have been admissible at common law.
The seal to be attached, if the method prescribed by the federal
statute is to be followed, must be that of the state; the seal of the
authenticating officer being insufficient if the state seal is omitted.53
It is not necessary that there be any attestation of the signature
,of the officer using the great seal because the seal of the state
imports verity. 54
49

There is a presumption that the officer attaching

Hunter v. Fulcher, (1827) 5 Rand. (Va.) 126; State v. Carr,
(1831) 5 N. Hamp. 367; Ansley v. Meikle, (1881) 81 Ind. 260, dictum,
because the copy was in fact authenticated in accordance with the
congressional statute; Title Guarantee and Trust Company v. Trenton
Potteries Co., (1897) 56 N. J. Eq. 441, 38 Atl. 422; The C. & 0. N.
Ry. Co. v. Berger, (1919) 10 Ohio App. 443. In McNeill v. Arnold,
(1856) 17 Ark. 154, "But this method of authentication is not regarded
as exclusive of any other mode which the states may respectively
adqpt." The cases cited infra, note 56, holding that printed books
may be admitted without the Great Seal must also go on the assumption that the congressional method of authentication is not exclusive.
A few cases seem contra, in result at least. Van Buskirk v. Mulock,
(1840) 18 N. J. L. 184. In Coit v. Milliken, (1845) 1 Denio (N.Y.)
376, and The President and Directors of the Union Bank of Md. v.
Freeman, (1843) 3 Rob. (La.) 485, the view is taken that a state could
not dispense with the requirement of a seal, and the Coit Case says
that the seal must be a wax impression.
503 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 1684-3C.
5
In re Peterson's Estate, (1912) 22 N. D. 480, 134 N. W. 751,
in which the court says that the states may make provision for easier
methods of proof than those specified in the congressional statute,
but that the states could not make the method of proof more difficult
than5 2that provided for by Congress.
State Bank v. Merchant's Bank, (1846) 10 Mo. 84. Remanded
on another point, and the court said that the statute could then be
proved in accordance with the federal statute, but apparently the
court5 did not regard that as necessary.
3Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Labuzan, (1860) 15 La. Ann. 295;
Sisk v. Woodruff, (1853) 15 Ill. 15; The President and Directors of
the Union Bank of Md. v. Freeman, (1843) 3 Rob. (La.) 485, holding
also, that a copy is inadmissible under the best evidence rule. But
see, contra, on the best evidence rule, Succession of Rice, (1869) 21
La. Ann. 614, the authentication being in accordance with the federal
statute.
"4Coit v. Milliken, (1845) 1 Denio (N.Y.) 376; State v. Carr, (1831)
5 N. H. 367; United States v. Amedy, (1826) 11 Wheat. (U.S.) 392,
6 L. Ed. 502 holding also, that erasures and interlineations are not
fatal, if they were made before the attestation. United States v. Johns,
(1896) 4 Dall. (U.S.) 412, 1 L. Ed. 888.
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the seal had authority to do so but the authentication must be
by an officer having custody of, or authority to use, the great
55
seal of the state.
For many years the question whether the statute of another
state must be proved by a copy of the original divided the courts.
A book of statutes published by authority of the state was admitted
by some courts56 but not by others.57 Apprehension was expressed
by some judges that fraud might be rendered easy of perpetration
by the admission of such a book, and a number of the early judges
seemed to feel more secure if an authenticated copy of the statute
was presented in evidence. 58 It is a little difficult to take seriously these expressions of fear, for it seems very unlikely that a
litigant would engage a publisher to run off an extra copy of
one of the official compilations of state statutes in order to have
a section or chapter changed for the purpose of deceiving the
55Robinson v. Gilman, (1841) 20 Me. 299. "It is a matter of
notoriety, and will be taken notice of as part of the law of nations,
acknowledged by all." The fact that the date of attestation precedes
the date of the attachment of the .Great Seal is not fatal. State v.
Cheek, (1851) 35 N. C. -114. See Elmore v. Mills, (1796) 1 Hayw.
(N.C.) 359; Wilson v. Walker, (1830) 3 Stew. (Ala.) 211. It need
not be stated in the authentication that the officer does have custody
of the seal. To show that the authenticating officer lacked authority
is a matter of defense. A certified copy by a notary public is insufficient. Bowles v. Wilbur, (1878) 33 Ark. 645, and so likewise is the
authentication of a clerk of one of the houses of the state legislature.
Elmore
56 v. Mills, (1796) 1 Hayw. (N.C.) 359.
Thompson v. Musser, (1789) 1 Dall. (U.S.) 458, 1 L. Ed. 222.
"The same reason that would induce this -Court to require a law of

Virginia to 'be proved as any other fact, must induce them to insist
upon the like proof of the laws of every other state, kingdom, or
empire, however remote; a position pregnant with intolerable inconvenience; destructive to trade, commerce, and credit; and in several cases, fatal to justice." In Poindexter v. Barker, (1802) 2 Hayw.
(N.C.) 173, the North Carolina court was in doubt as to the admissibility of a printed book of Virginia laws, but finally decided in favon
of admission, saying, "The bare possibility of such a mischief is in
no way comparable to that of sending the parties to Virginia in every
case to get a certified copy whenever a law of Virginia is to be
produced; where at the same time the court has every reasonable
assurance that the law is contained in the printed book, it 'being
printed by the public printer, and being a counterpart of the books
used in Virginia to show their laws." Biddis v. James, (1814) 6
Binney
57 (Pa.) 321.
State v. Twitty, (1823) 9 N. C. 441, 11 Am. Dec. 779. The
court said, admitting that the admission of printed books was convenient, "But the rule which admits such evidence as to one state,
must satisfy its competency as to all the states, however remote from,
or unconnected with us, in social or commercial intercourse, and this
would
certainly open a door for fraud and imposition."
58
See the expressions in State v. Twitty, supra note 57, and Poindexter v. Barker, supra note 56.

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PUBLIC ACTS

court. On the other hand, it would be a relatively simple matter
to forge a manuscript copy of a statute, as well as an official
authentication and seal of the state, if rascality is to be assumed.19
Most of the judges, without the encouragement of statute, allowed
books of statutes printed by authority of the legislature to be
'admitted, although a few of the more timid ones felt on safer
ground if the oral testimony of a practitioner to the effect that
the book was admitted in current practice in the courts of the
state from which the laws were supposed to come, was added. 60
Statutes in many states now provide for the admission of such
books, and a number of them allow the admission of books not
printed by legislative authority, if they are shown to be commonly
admitted in the home state. 6' The disinclination of opposing
counsel to take advantage of the rule of evidence barring privately
printed books, in the absence of statute, perhaps serves to mitigate
to some extent, the inconvenience of the rule.
If one were to examine the most recent compilations of the
laws of the forty-eight states in any law library he would probably
59These expressions of caution are not met with in the later
cases although the same attitude perhaps underlies the refusal to
allow privately printed books in evidence, though currently used in
the state whose laws they purport to contain. See infra note 61.
1 Starkie, Evidence 163, note 2.
wRockville & W. Turnpike Road v. Andrew, (CC. D.C. 1824)
2 Cr. C. C. 451, Fed. Cas. No. 11,984; Wakeman v. Marquand, (1825)
5 Martin N. S. (La.) 264; The Inhabitants of Raynham v. The Inhabitants of Canton, (1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 293. In Allen v. Watson,
(1834) 2 Hill (S.C.) 319, the South Carolina court took the following
view, "but I am unable to perceive any possible advantage which that
mode of proof has over the printed book. The liability to err in
copying is precisely the same in the copyist as in the printer; and
it would be unsafe to trust to the certificate of the officer, if that was
part of his duty, that the statute was or was not repealed; the keeper
of the public records is not necessarily a lawyer, and whether a
statute had or had not been repealed, might involve a question of
difficulty; and upon the whole, it appears to me quite as safe ton
trust to a book bearing such evidence of authenticity, as to a certified
copy of the statute." Occasionally a question is raised as to the
application of the best evidence rule to this situation. Thus parol
evidence is inadmissible because of that rule. Vickers v. Faubion,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 224 S. W. 803. See The Inhabitants of Raynham v. The Inhabitants of Canton, (1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 293. 1
Greenleaf, Evidence, 16th ed., sec. 488, says that the only way in
which the admissibility of printed books containing statutes can be
justified is by an exception to the hearsay rule. See, in general, on
the admissibility of a statute book, Note in Ann. Cas. 1916D 854-57.
For a discussion as to the need of expert testimony to explain the
meaning of a sister-state statute see the remarks of Gummere, J., in
Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Trenton Potteries Co., (1897) 56
N. J. Eq. 441, 38 Ati. 422.
613 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 1684-3c.
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be surprised to learn how few of them are authorized by the state.
Over three-fourths of the compilations of state laws now in current use are privately printed. For this reason it is important that
either by statute or by decision the rule be established that privately printed books of statutes are admissible if they are in common
use in the state whose statutes they purport to be.62

If the statutes contained in such a book have been repealed
or amended in any particular, it is for the party asserting the
change to prove the same. 63 The pertinent sections of the statute
are sufficient, it not being necessary to prove the entire statute, 64
and if the opposition wishes to show that other parts of the statute
qualify the sections put in evidence, it must give evidence of the
qualifying sections. Statutes referred to in the body of a statute
of which oin authenticated copy is introduced need not be set out
in full63 and if a statute has been proved in a prior case in the
state court it need not again be proved in a subsequent case.66
Reports of judicial decisions, if official, are admitted in the
absence of statute under an exception to the hearsay rule, being
official books or documents.6 7 Here again, as in the case of statutes, privately printed reports are not always included in the
statutes that have been enacted regulating this subject, 68 and in
the absence of statute they are inadmissible in many states.6 9
Privately printed reports of judicial decisions should also be ad62

Privately printed books have been held inadmissible in the
absence of statute.
Bostwick v. Bogardus, (1795) 2 Root 250;
Lanigan v. North, (1901) 69 Ark. 62, 63 S. W. 62. Statutes providing
for the admission of books printed by authority of the legislature
have sometimes been construed to exclude the admission of privately
printed books. Lamb v. De Vault, (1908) 139 111. App. 398. See
Bride v. Clark, (1894) 161 Mass. 130, 36 N. E. 745.
6
SThe Inhabitants of Raynham v. The Inhabitants, of -Canton,
(1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 293; Hunter v. Fulcher, (1827) 5 Rand. (Va.)
126.
64Sullivan v. Williams, (1847) 14 La. Ann. 807; Succession of
Grant, (1850) 2 La. Ann. 876. All of a judgment must be shown,
but "with regard to laws, every section is a distinct fact." Hunter v.
Fulcher, (1827) 5 Rand. (Va.) 126.
65
Grant v. Henry ,Clay Coal Co., (1876) 80 Pa. 208. When wanting to prove an amending act extending the statute of incorporation
the original act of incorporation need not be set out in full. Philadelphia Bank v. Lambeth, (1843) 4 Rob. (La.) 463.
6
Graham v. Williams, (1869) 21 La. Ann. 594; McCarty v.
Strauss, (1869) 21 La. Ann. 596. But reports of decisions are not
sufficient to prove statutes set out therein, in the course of an opinion.
Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Ryan, (1919) (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W.
642.
6173 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 1703.
6
sIbid., note 2.
69Ibid., note 1.
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missible if commonly admitted in the courts of the state from
which the decisions purport to come, and statutes not already so
providing should be amended to that end. Some of the privately
printed reports are not only as accurate and reliable as the official
reports themselves but are in some instances more reliable and
complete than the latter. To exclude them works a serious hardship in some instances.
It will perhaps be recalled that the rule regarding the proof
of foreign and sister-state law was stated in terms requiring it
to be proved as a fact. Does this mean that the statutes and decisions of a sister state are to go to the jury along with the other
evidence in the case? There is some confusion in the cases on
this point. Some courts apparently take the view that because
they are to be proved as facts they must go to the jury.70 Others
say that the proof of the existence of a statute or decision may be
a matter for the jury, but that the interpretation of these is a
matter for the court.71 In some cases several statutes and as
many as thirty or forty decisions are introduced. To present
this mass of material to the jury is a practice difficult to support.
Yet such is the practice in some courts, resulting from the premise
that foreign law is fact, and therefore for the consideration of the
jury.
The root of the evil, so to speak, is that of regarding foreign
law as different from domestic law, so far as the division of labor
between judge and jury is concerned. The method of finding out
what the rule on a particular point in Massachusetts is differs
in no respect from that used in finding out what the rule in
Nebraska is, so far as the courts of Massachusetts are concerned.
In either case the constitution, statutes, and decisions of the jurisdiction are examined and interpreted. For that reason no differ705 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2558; Notes in 34 A. L. R.
1445, 11 Am. Dec. 780. J. B. Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials,
4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 172. The Massachusetts rule prior to the enactment of the judicial notice statute in 1926 (see note 97) seems to,
have been to let the court pass upon the interpretation of the foreign
law if there were only a few decisions involved, but to pass the task
on to the jury if many and conflicting decisions were involved. See
Wylie v. Cotter, (1898) 170 Mass. 356, 49 N. E. 746 and Hancock
Ntl. Bank v. Ellis, (1898) 172 Mass. 39, 51 N. E. 207. Sister-state
statutes have been held so strictly fact that to plead them in a demurrer constitutes a "speaking demurrer." Bennett v. Lohman, (1921)
292 Mo. 477, 238 S. W. 792. See the statute in 2 New Jersey Comp.
Stats. 1910 p. 2228, providing that proof of foreign statutes is to be
made to th- court.
7'State v. Jackson, (1830) 13 N. C. 563.
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ent method of proving the law of another state should be used
than is used for showing the law of the forum. If the movement
of the last century to take the determination of questions of law
away from the jury was sound then also the movement to take
the consideration of foreign law from the jury is sound.
In order to avoid some of the difficulties arising from the
practice of treating foreign law as fact a number of state courts
decided to take judicial notice of sister-state laws and usages in
cases involving suits on judgments rendered in another state.72
The fact that the congressional statute enjoined the states to give
to sister-state judgments the effect which they had by law or
usage in the state of their rendition was seized upon by some
courts to justify the introduction of judicial notice in -such cases.
In Curtis v. Martit,7 involving an action in New Jersey on
a Pennsylvania judgment, the court said,
"But we are here told by the defendant's counsel that what
faith and credit is due to records or judicial proceedings in other
states is a question of fact to be tried by a jury .. . j think
72
Foster v. Taylor, (1812) 2 Tenn. 191; Wilson v. Jackson, (1847)
10 Mo. 329; Baxter v. Linah, (1851) 16 Pa. St. 234, 55 Am. Dec. 494;
Rae v. Hulbert, (1856) 17 Ili. 592; Butcher v. Bank of Brownsville,
(1863)

2 Kan. 70 (notice constitution of Pennsylvania); Buffum v.

(1871)

22 N. J. Eq. 115 (notices sister-state statutes giving jurisdiction

Stimpson, (1863) 87 Mass. 591 (not entirely clear); Davis v. Headley,
to court); Coffee v. Neely, (1871) 2 Tenn. 304 (dictum "because statute
conferred the power on the court to judicially notice sister-state

statutes) ; Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., (1"876) 11 R. I. 411 (notices
New York statutes); Hull v. Webb, (1898) 78 IIl. App. 617 (probably dictum because counsel had by stipulation agreed to consider
law in evidence); Sprecklemeyer v. Bailey, (1888) 23 Neb. 101, 8 Am.
Rep. 119 (notices jurisdiction of Indiana circuit courts) ; Jones v.
Quaker City Fire Ins. Co., (1900) 9 Pa. Dist. Rep. 213; Hinman v.
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co., (1910) 83 Kan. 35, 110 Pac. 102,
21 Ann. Cas. 1152 (notices constitution of Missouri) ; Miller v. Miller,
(1916) 90 Wash. 333, 156 Pac. 8 (notices Illinois statutes); Union
Savings Ass'n v. Cummins, (1920) 78 Okla. 265, 190 Pac. 869 (notices
provision of North Dakota Civil Code, but not decisive of case);
Hewitt v. Hewitt, (1922) 44 R. I. 308, 116 At1. 883. Judicial notice
is not, in these cases, restricted to constitutions and statutes, but
extends in some instances to the decisions under the statutes. Shriver
v. Garrison, (1887) 30 W. Va. 456, prior to the present West Virginia
statute on judicial notice cited in note 97. In Evans v. Tatem, (1829)
9 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 253 the court seems to have noticed the effect
a decree had by the law of the state wherein rendered. Notice was
taken of state constitutions in Dodge v. Coffin, (1875) 15 Kan. 277;
Robinson v. Railway Co., (1915) 96 Kan. 137, 150 Pac. 636; Shotwell
v. Harrison, (1871) 22 Mich. 410. Closely analogous are cases like
Jarvis v. Robinson, (1866) 21 Wis. 523, 94 Am. Dec. 560, and Steel
v. Hathway Lmbr. Co., (1913) 183 Ill. App. 378, noticing jurisdiction
of courts of other states.
73(1805) 2 N. J.L. 377.
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differently. . . This court will certainly take notice of the constitutions of the states forming the Union, if not of their statutes
Perhaps the leading case to the same effect is that of State
of Ohio v. Hinchman.7 4 The much quoted statement in that case
of the reason for taking judicial notice of the laws of the state
from which the judgment is brought is as follows:
"A judgment of this court, adverse to the right arising out
of the federal constitution and legislation, would be reviewable in
the Supreme Court of the United States and there the states of
the confederacy are not regarded as foreign states, whose laws and
usages must be proved, but as domestic institutions, whose laws
are to be noticed without pleading or proof. It would be a very
imperfect and discordant administration for the court of original
jurisdiction to adopt one rule of decision, while the court of final
resort was governed by another; and hence it follows, that in
questions of this sort, we should take notice of the local laws of
a sister state in the same manner as the Supreme Court of the
United States would do on a writ of error to our judgment."
This has been regarded as a leading statement of the reason
why judicial notice of the laws of another state should be taken
in actions on judgments from that state. However, the fact that
"it would be a very imperfect and discordant administration" of
justice did not prevent the Supreme Court of the United States
75
from holding, in Hanley v. Donaghue, that it would not, on
appeal from a tate court notice the laws of a state other than
the one from which the appeal was brought, unless the courts
of the latter state noticed them. The Hanley Case has sometimes been considered as overturning the rule enunciated in the
Hihchinan Case, but it is clear that the decision in the Hanley
Case had no such far-reaching effect, although it did eliminate
the reason stated for the rule in the Hinchmaan Case.
If the practice of taking judicial notice of the laws of a state
from which a judgment is brought is desirable in this type of
case the Hanley Case furnishes an exceedingly strong argument
in favor of extending the practice because if the state courts do
so, then, according to the Hanley Case, the Supreme Court will
do so; otherwise not. The way to insure judicial notice of the
laws of state X on an appeal to the Supreme Court from state
Y is for state Y to notice the laws of state X. It is true that
74(1856) 27 Pa. St. 479.

See criticism of this case in Rape v.

Heaton, (1859) 9 Wis. 328, 76 Am. Dec. 269.
75(1885) 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242, 29 L. Ed. 535.

Renaud v.
Abbott, (1885) 116 U. S. 277, 6 Sup. Ct. 1194, 29 L. Ed. 629.
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the court in the Hanley Case stated in a dictum that the laws
of a sister state should be proved in the state courts in actions
on sister-state judgments, but that statement was only a generalization based on a number of state cases, and had no binding
effect upon the state courts. The decision in the Hanley Case
has been criticized and it seems difficult to support.7 6 At any
rate it is clear that it offers no obstacle to the extension of the
doctrine of judicial notice to the laws of other states in actions
on sister-state judgments.
It is believed. that some advantages may be derived from the
adoption of the practice of judicially noticing the laws of other
7681 Greenleaf, Evidence, 16th ed., sec. 488d, referring to the case
as having been decided upon "the somewhat scholastic theory" that
the Supreme Court could not know on appeal what the court below
did not know. 1 Jones, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 405 seems to favor
the view that the state courts should notice the laws of the state
from which a judgment is brought. 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed.,
sec. 2573, speaking of the refusal to take such notice in this class
of cases, says: "But this theory is now antiquated hypocrisy, as
applied in this field, and there is a wholesome tendency to abandon
it." Many courts have, however, refused to apply the doctrine of
judicial notice to sister-state judgment cases. Bostwick v. Bogardus,
(1795) 2 Root 250; Craig v. Brown, (C.C. Pa. f816) 1 Peters C. C.
352, Fed. Cas. No. 3,328; Elliott v. Ray, (1826) 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 31;
Cubbedge, Hazelhurst & Co. v. Napier, (1878) 62 Ala. 518; Scott v.
Coleman, (1824) 5 Littell (Ky.) 349; Cone v. Cotton, (1827) 2 Blackf.
(Ind.) 81; State v. Jackson, (1830) 13 N. -C. 563; Sheldon v. Hopkins,
(1831) 7 Wend. (N.Y.) 453; Pelton v. Platner, (1844) 13 Ohio 209;
Taylor v. Barron, (1855) 30 N. H. 78, 64 Am. Dec. 281; Dragoo v.
Graham, (1857) 9 Ind. 202; Rape v. Heaton, (1859) 9 Wis. 328, 76
Am. Dec. 269; Knapp v. Abel, (1865) 10 Allen (Mass.) 485, see Massachusetts statute in note 97; Osborn v. Blackburn, (1890) 78 Wis.
209, see Wisconsin statute in note 94; Crafts v. Clark, (1870) 31 Ia.
77; Teel v. Yost, (1889) 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 456, 5 N. Y. S. 5, 22 N. Y.
St. Rep. 415; Thomas v. Pendleton, (1890) 1 S. D. 150, 46 N. W.
180; Hunt v. Monroe, (1907) 32 Utah 428, 91 Pac. 269, 11 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 249; De Vall v. De Vall, (1910) 57 Or. 128, 109 Pac. 755;
Mitchell v. Liggett, (1921) 70 Col. 219, 199 Pac. 486. Some courts
hold that judicial notice will not be taken if the proceedings whereby
the judgment was obtained are extraordinary, or unrecognized in the
forum, and that in such cases the statutory authority for the proceedings must be pleaded in the action on the judgment. Home
Brewing Co. v. Ozokerite Co., (1921) 58 Utah 219, 198 Pac. 170. In
Hinson v. Wall, (1852) 20 Ala. 298, the court held that a sister-state
judgment would be presumed to have the same effect that it would
have if rendered in the forum, until the contrary was shown. The
view that a judgment from another state would carry with it prima
facie evidence of jurisdiction was taken in Wright v. Andrews, (1881)
130 Mass. 149. See Black, Judgments, sec. 875. In 1 Chamberlayne,
Modern Law of Evidence 783, the position is taken that judicial notice
should not be taken because of the administrative convenience of
having laws proved. The administrative convenience of not having
them proved is one of the strongest arguments in favor of judicial
notice.
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states, not only in judgment suits, but in all types of cases involving the laws of those states. The necessity of proving
statutes and decisions to a jury is dispensed with and no question
is raised as to whether the judge or jury should pass upon the
proof or interpretation of sister-state law. While the statement
of an Ohio justice that: "This court is not bound to take notice
ex officio, of the laws of other states, and it is no enviable task
to keep pace with the solons of our own,"'77 is witty, it misconceives the nature and result of judicial notice. The use of judicial
notice does not mean that judges will have to commit to memory
the laws of the forty-eight states. The court is at liberty to
inform itself in any manner, of the laws of another state, and
may utilize the aid of counsel whenever that is desirable. Judicial
notice does not dispense with the necessity of pleading that reliance
is had on some sister-state statute78 although the court is not
restricted to the particular statutes referred to in the pleadings .7
Counsel will still be at liberty to present argument as to what the
foreign law is, but such argument will be directed to the court,
instead of to the jury, as is the case in arguments on the domestic
law.
Something will have been accomplished towards the elimination of some of the many confusing presumptions now applied
in cases involving foreign or sister-state law by the introduction
of judicial notice."" The following extract from the opinion of
Chief Justice Field, in the California case of Morris v. Harrisl
illustrates the artificial character of the basis of some of these
presumptions:
"... We kre not at liberty to follow our own arbitrary notion
of justice. We cannot take judicial notice of the law of Texas,
and we must, therefore, as a matter of necessity, look to our own
laws as furnishing the only rule of decision upon which we can
act; and to meet the requirement that the case is to be disposed of
according to the law of Texas, the presumption is indulged that
the laws of the two states are in accordance with each other."
77Pelton v. Platner, (1884) 13 Ohio 209.
78Infra, note 99.

79Judicial notice does not deal with pleading, but concerns the
manner of showing the foreign law to the court. In so far as notice
should be given by the pleadings that foreign law is relied on in a
case, 0the requirement that it be pleaded seems reasonable.
9 0n the confused state of these presumptions see Jones, Evidence, secs. 420-26; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2536; McKelvy,
Evidence, 3d ed., p. 128; Kales, Presumptions of the Foreign Law.
19 Harv. L. Rev. 401; von Moschzisker, Presumptions As to Foreign
Law, 11 MINNESOTA LAW REvizw 1.
81(1860) 15 Cal. 226.
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A presumption as to foreign law operates as a procedural
device, and does not attempt to find out what the rule of law
is, for the given case. It is purely a matter of procedure. Judicial
notice is a device for finding out what the particular rule of
foreign law actually is, and does not operate upon the order of
procedure or other incidents of the trial. The proof of the rule
of law of a sister state is made in exactly the same manner as
the proof of domestic law, and while counsel may argue the
point, the process is not subject to rules of evidence in the sense
that those rules apply to the proof of facts which are to be
82
determined by the jury, or in the absence of a jury, by the court.
The absurd results that follow from a refusal to take judicial
notice of the law of a sister state, while not conclusive against
that attitude, nevertheless should serve to cast some discredit
upon it. Thus, for example, state and national courts will occasionally be found examining the decisions of a given state court
for the purpose of ascertaining their legal reason, rules, and
principles, but in the same case refusing to consider those deci83
sions as evidence of what the law is in that state.
There is nothing in the full faith and credit clause forbidding
state courts to notice the laws of other states. 4 Neither is it
inherently impossible for the courts of one state to judicially
notice the laws of another state. The following tabulation indicates the extent to which judicial notice of foreign or sister-state
law is taken by the federal and state courts, in the absence of
statute.
82
1t is believed that the words of the Mississippi statute on judicial
notice (see note 96) accurately express the -theory of the doctrine as

applied to foreign law: "When any question shall arise as to the law
of the United States or of any other state or territory of the United
States, or of the District of Columbia, or of any foreign country, the
court shall take notice of such law in the same manner as if the
question arose under the law of this state." The relation of judicial
notice to the various presumptions as to foreign law have not been
well worked out. See the comments in 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d
ed., sec. 2573; 1 Jones, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 29. The writer cannot
but feel that there is no relation between them; presumptions concern
rules of procedure while judicial notice is a rule of substantive law
in so far as it relates to foreign law..
83
Note, 67 L. R. A. 34. Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co..
(1902) 187 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 194, 47 L. Ed. 273: Fourth National
Bank84 of Montgomery v. Bragg, (1920) 127 Va. 47, 102 S. E. 649.
The only case located by the writer in which the effect of the
full faith and credit clause was considered on the doctrine of judicial
notice, in cases other than those involving sister-state judgments, is
that of Warner v. State, (1817) 2 Va. Cas. 95, holding that they would
not take judicial notice.
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1. The United States Supreme Court takes judicial notice of
the laws of all of the states in cases coming before it under its
original jurisdiction. s
2. The same court notices the laws of the states in cases
coming to it on appeal from the lower federal courts."6
3. The Supreme Court notices the laws of another state than
the one from which an appeal is brought if the latter state notices
them."'
4. The lower federal courts take judicial notice of the laws
of all of the states, not merely of the states in which they sit. 8
5. A number of state courts, without the aid of statute,
notice sister-state law in actions on judgments. 9
6. State courts notice federal statutes. 90
7. They also notice the laws of other states when the latter
are adopted by or incorporated into congressional statutes. 91
8. The courts of a state which has been carved out of the
territory of one of the existing states notice the laws of th latter,
as they existed prior to the admission of the former into the
Union.0 2 Thus Maine would notice the laws of Massachusetts
that were in force at the time Maine was idmitted to the Union.
93
9. In accordance with the rule of Carpenter v. Dexter,
"where one state recognizes acts done in pursuance of the laws
of another state, its courts will take judicial cognizance of those
laws, so far as it may be necessary to determine the validity of
the acts alleged to be in conformity with them." As limited by
85Hanley v. Donaghue, (1885) 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242, 29
L. Ed. 535.
8
876jones, Evidence, sec. 407.
Hanley v. Donaghue, (1885) 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242, 29
L. Ed. 535.
88
American Clearing Co. v. Walkill Stock Farms Co., (D.C.
Fla. 1923) 293 Fed. 58, holding that the laws of the states need neither
be pleaded nor proved. Jones, Evidence, sec. 407. The writer of a
note in 11 Am. Dec. at p. 782 points out that logically the inferior
federal courts should notice only the laws of the states in which they
sit, but he observes, that "judicial knowledge rests on no such shifting
foundation, nor is it liable to such violent lapses of memory."
89Supra,
note 72.
0
0Jones, Evidence, sec. 402.
?'Flanigan v. The Washington Ins. Co., (1847) 7 Pa. St. 306.
925 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2573e; Jones, Evidence, sec. 404.
93(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 513, 19 L. Ed. 426. Approved in Little
v. Herndon, (1869) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 26, 19 L. Ed. 880; involving a
deed from another state, as was the case in Dexter v. Carpenter. In
Morse v. Hewett, (1874) 28 Mich. 481 and Munroe v. Eastman, (1875)
31 Mich. 83, the constitution of New York was noticed to learn that
a clerk of Queens County was the clerk of the supreme court and
therefore the proper official to perform a certain act.
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the Hanley Case the Dexter Case seems still to be law, although
there is apparently some dissent from its doctrine. 9
10. State courts will notice the general legal system of
another state or countryf 5
To have extended the application of the doctrine of judicial
notice to ordinary cases of contract and tort in which the law
of a sister state is involved would not have been a radical step
for the courts to take.96 They have, however, as previously
indicated, declined to make this extension. The result of this
has been the enactment of statutes in thirteen states which either
allow or compel the courts to judicially notice the law or laws
of other states or countries, as the case may be, whenever they
are involved in a case.97 These statutes vary greatly in their
scope,98 and represent the legislative experimentation now going
on in this field, some of the inconveniences of which, it is believed, could have been avoided if the state courts had of their
own initiative followed the lead of the two early cases from
Vermont and Georgia.
In summary of the contents of this study it may be said:
1. That state constitutions, statutes, and, in some cases,
94Sumner v. Mitchell, (1892) 29 Fla. 179, 10 So. 715, 14 L. R. A.
825, 30 Am. St. Rep. 124, "We find no other decision to this effect,
the general rule being that the statute law of another state is to be
proved according to the law of the forum in which the trial is had."
Fellows v. The President and Trustees of Menosha, (1860) 11 Wis.
558 (refusing to notice that a judge before whom an oath was taken
was a county judge in New York). Adams v. Stenehjem, (1915) 50
Mont. 232, 146 Pac. 469 (refusing to notice statute to see if clerk had
authority
to certify a copy of a judgment).
95
Kales, Presumptions of Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 401,
403-04.

96Professor Wigmore vigorously scolds the courts for their
timidity in applying the doctrine .of judicial notice. 5 Wigmore,_
Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 2573 and 2583. Thayer, J.B., says, in Law
and Fact In Jury Trials, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 172, "In reason the
judges might well enough be allowed to inform themselves about
foreign law in any mariner they choose, just as the judges of the
federal courts notice without proof the laws of all the states. But
since97it is required to be proved, it should be proved to the judge."
Arkansas, Digest of the Statutes (Crawford and Moses 1921)
sec. 4110; Connecticut, G. S. 1918, secs. 5726-27; Georgia, Code 1926,
sec. 5818; Illinois, As to the Municipal Court of Chicago, R. S.
(Cahill 1927) chapter 37, sec. 447-2; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves
1926, chapter 168; Michigan, C. L. 1915, sec. 12,513, 12,515; Mississippi,
1 Annotated Code (Hemingway 1927) sec. 771; New Jersey, 2 C. L.
1910, p. 2228, sec. 25; North Dakota, C. L. 1913, secs. 7937 and 7938,
subd. 63 and 64; Tennessee, Code (Thompson's Shannon's 1918) sec.
5586; Virginia, G. L. 1923, sec. 6194a; West Virginia, Code (Warth
1899)98 chap. 13, sec. 4; Wisconsin, 2 Statutes 1921, sec. 4135m.
See the analysis of these statutes in Comment, infra note 99.
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charters of corporations and judicial decisions construing them,
are included within the meaning of the phrase "public acts."
2. That the effect of the full faith and credit clause is, in
some cases at least, particularly those involving corporations and
mutual benefit societies, to compel state courts to give effect to
the law of the state in which such an association was incorporated,
or in which a given transaction took place. The Supreme Court
will perhaps tend to extend by a gradual process the doctrine of
these cases to such other types as the reasoning of the "associations" cases applies. Stated in another way, this means that the
Supreme Court is likely to give a somewhat broader application
to the full faith and credit clause, as applied to public acts, in
the future than it has in the past.
3. The congressional statute prescribing the method of
authenticating the legislative acts of other states does not exclude
other methods of authentication, and many states have by statute
provided for different methods. Statute books printed by legislative authority or in common use in a state are admissible in a
large number of states, though not in all, as evidence of the
statutes of that state. To a more limited extent the same is true
of reports of judicial decisions. The courts of some states have
applied the doctrine of judicial -notice in judgment cases, but
they have not, in the absence of statute, extended that doctrine
to ordinary cases not involving sister-state judgments. As a
result, statutes have been enacted in about one-fourth of the
states allowing or compelling the courts to take judicial notice
of the law of a sister state whenever such law is involved. It
is likely that this statutory extension of the doctrine will spread
quite rapidly to other states. In drafting such statutes the
Massachusetts or Mississippi laws might well serve as admirable
models. 9
99
The texts of these two statutes, as well as those of the other
states, will be found in an appendix to a Comment, Statutory Extension of Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 37 Yale L. J. (April).

